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This article examines the emergence since 2011 of the ‘Diaosi’ (loser) identity 
among Chinese second generation migrant workers. This subjective identification of 
a new social category with little hope can be contrasted with the hopeful policy 
constructions of a strong China eager to promote the civilizing ‘suzhi’ (population 
quality) of its population nationally and internationally. Yet, as this article shows, in 
four steps, these phenomena are intertwined. First, it locates the emergence of this 
‘Diaosi’ subject in the global and national dialectics of hope in China since the global 
financial crisis. In brief, while transnational policy and business actors constructed 
emerging markets, especially China, as objects of hope and sources of demand, the 
Chinese party-state had been hoping, since the 1990s, to build national strength and 
improve the sushi (quality) of its population. It was in this conjuncture that the Diaosi 
subject emerged. Second, drawing on neo-Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian 
scholarship, Diaosi marginality is related to the interaction among global capitalist 
production, the socialist market economy, continuous state domination via a 
household registration system (hukou), and the civilizing discourse of ‘suzhi’. 
Focusing on the suzhi-hukou discourses and practices, it examines this ensemble as 
a biopolitical population management system that devalues migrant workers’ lives 
and labour-power, obliging migrant workers to live and work in marginal conditions. A 
recent expression of this marginality is the making of the Diaosi subject position. 
Third, it shows how the Diaosi embody their multiplex loser identity and marginality 
affectively and expressively in their everyday demeanour. This signification system is 
characterized by a fragmented and ‘contradictory consciousness’ that combines 
resistance and resignation. Fourth, it examines recent efforts by state/corporate 
capital and the party-state to re-make and re-hegemonize Diaosi life in the name of 
consumption, civility and social stability. The article ends with remarks on the 
potential of (neo-)Gramscian insights on subalternity and subalterns for examining 
the complexities of marginal social categories such as the Diaosi and their 
embodiment of contradictory consciousness as well as the passive revolution and 
(re-)hegemonization that are involved. 
 





This article examines the emergence of Chinese second-generation migrant workers 
who have been narrating and presenting themselves as ‘Diaosi’ (losers) since 2011. 
This self-identification of a new subject category with little hope can be juxtaposed to 
the concurrent policy constructions of China as an object of hope and strength eager 
to promote the civilizing ‘suzhi’ (population quality) of its people on (inter-)national 
levels. Yet these two phenomena are intertwined. This article has four sections. First, 
it locates the emergence of this ‘Diaosi’ subject in the dialectics of China as hope 
object since the global financial crisis. With the fear of recession in the US and 
Europe, emerging markets, especially China, have been constructed as objects of 
hope and sources of demand by transnational policy and business actors. This was 
articulated to China’s own hope, evident since the 1990s, of building national 
strength, improving the ‘suzhi’ of its population, etc. This dialectics of hope was a 
central feature of the conjuncture in which the Diaosi subject emerged.  
 
Second, drawing on neo-Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian scholarship, Diaosi 
marginality is analysed in terms of a co-governance by global capitalist production, 
the socialist market economy, continuous state domination via a household 
registration system (hukou), and the civilizing discourse of ‘suzhi’ (Pun 2005; 
Anagnost 2004; Yan 2008). Focusing on suzhi-hukou discourses and practices, the 
article examines them as a biopolitical population management mechanism in which 
less value is attached to migrant workers’ lives and their labour-power receives lower 
wages. This sushi-hukou way of reproducing and managing inequalities means that 
migrants live in marginal conditions. Their marginality and subalternity are 
popularized through terms such as ‘Dwelling Narrowness’, ‘ant tribe’, and ‘rat tribe’ 
and, most recently, the Diaosi subject. Third, the article focuses more on the Diaosi’s 
subjective embodiment of marginality in their everyday affective and expressive 
demeanour. Their experiences of exclusion, devaluation, unfulfilled consumer and 
romantic desires are central to the Diaosi-loser system of signification. This is far 
from consistent but involves what Gramsci terms ‘contradictory consciousness’, 
which comprises resistance and resignation. Fourth, it considers current efforts by 
state/corporate capital and the party-state to re-make and re-hegemonize Diaosi life 
in the name of consumption, civility, and social stability. The article ends with some 
neo-Gramscian remarks on the complexities and contradictory consciousness of 
marginal social categories, such as the Diaosi, and their openness to passive 
revolution and (re-)hegemonization. 
 
 
Financial Crisis and the Dialectics of China Hope 
 
The 2007 financial crisis in North America and Western Europe prompted fears of 
recession, rising debts and growing austerity. In response, transnational capitals 
sought new sites of demand and investment outside these regions. Emerging 
economies such as China were discursively constructed as dream sites that could 
contribute towards a global recovery (Sum 2013a). More specifically, until its own 
economic slowdown began in 2013, some (inter-)national policy-makers, think tanks, 
consultancy firms, bankers and economic journalists (e.g., Jaeger 2008; The 
Economist 2008; O’Neill 2013) represented the ‘BRIC’ economies, especially ‘China’, 
as global hegemonic ‘hope’ objects that could ‘drive’ global growth. Narratives such 
as ‘China as the big BRIC’, ‘China as the second largest economy in the world’, 
‘China has an 8% GDP growth rate’, ‘China has a large middle-class consumer 
market’, etc., were circulated transnationally (for dissenting views, see Chanos 2011; 
Block 2011; Pettis 2011).  
 
This hegemonic hope for global recovery is articulated to the Chinese Communist 
Party’s hope for national glory through modernity (Yang and Lim 2010; Wang 2014), 
consumer citizenship (Hooper 2005; Ren 2013), and a neo-Confucian ‘civility’ (Bell 
2010) conducive to ‘social harmony’ (later in terms of the ‘China Dream’). Discourses 
on ‘harmony’ and ‘suzhi’ are prevalent in policy and everyday life since the 1990s 
(Anagnost 2004; Yan 2008; Jacka 2009). This approach to the art of governing has 
many manifestations but one particular expression is the discourse of middle-class 
‘suzhi’ (Tomba 2009). This new class, comprising urban professionals and 
entrepreneurs, is constructed as ‘suzhi’ bearers. Their embodiment of population 
quality includes education, lifestyle, civil dispositions and the ability to capacitate 
themselves to appreciate the ‘finer things in life’ (Zhang 2010: 19; Ren 2011: 118-21; 
2013: 34-44). This embodiment of ‘suzhi’ is especially pronounced in the middle-
class consumer subjects whose actions are seen as stimulating the market without 
challenging the social order (Tomba 2009).  
 
This co-identification of global China and its domestic middle class as hope objects 
was materially grounded in the rolling out of neoliberal measures/techniques in 
China under socialist state rule/guidance (Pow 2012: 38-39). Focusing on middle-
class housing as symbolic of these changes, this middle-class hope for ‘suzhi’ life is 
intertwined with the desire for housing and homeownership in urban metropoles 
(Zhang 2010: 52-78). From a political economy perspective, this remaking of 
neoliberal personhood has depended on the marketization of land and housing 
markets from the 1990s onwards. This allowed for the institutionalization of land-use 
right market as well as the purchase of commercialized housing (Wu, Xu and Yeh 
2006: 50). It allows local governments (and their investment arms), land/property 
developers and state-owned banks to: (a) derive income from selling land-use rights, 
obtaining land-based loans, collateralizing land/property, and 
building/selling/speculating commodity housing for profit; and (b) pursue GDP growth 
rates (as GDPism) (Sum 2013b) that help cadres and those with connections rise up 
the bureaucratic ranks (Sum 2013a). This land- and property-based mode of 
accumulation and its related home consumption form one of the avenues in which 
the middle-class can demonstrate and realize wealth, status, ‘suzhi’ and exclusivity. 
‘Finer things in life’ include home ownership, housing choice, home wealth 
generation, home décor, living in a gated community, quality family, quality 
husband/wife/children, etc. (Zhang 2010; Xiao 2010). The hope of creating a good 
life and social distinction is also reflected in the culture of marriage. The dream of 
‘living happily ever after’ is to self-capacitate (with extended family support) to buy 
property, find a partner with matching qualities and improve on one’s future ‘sushi’ 
and aspirations. There is a patriarchal folk saying of ‘no car, no house, no bride’ 
(Offheat China 2011) that aptly captures these aspirations as well as the 
unevenness of the consumer, marriage, love and intimacy markets in China. 
 
This mode of land- and property-based accumulation was reinforced by the onset of 
the 2007 financial crisis. Worried about falling exports and rising unemployment, the 
Chinese leadership proposed a four-trillion Renminbi stimulus package in 2008 to 
reflate the economy (Naughton 2009). Up to 2011 this was coupled with US 
quantitative easing and related financial inflows to China (Cho and Rhee 
2013).These policy measures were well-received by the international policy and 
business communities; but they have aggravated the deep-rooted central-local fiscal 
relations and local governments’ efforts to appropriate and use land as collateral and 
to raise revenue. This intensified real estate inflation and fears of a ‘property bubble’ 
in China since 2009 (Powell 2010; Huang 2013). During the peak boom period from 
2003 to 2012, property prices in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai rose 3.65 
and 3.41 times respectively ((Xianhuanet.com 2013. As for rents, the average unit 
rose three times in the same period (Baidu.com 2013).1 These bubble tendencies 
have accentuated the impact of uneven development on the material standards of 
urban dwellers and migrant workers labouring under poor conditions. Social unrest in 
terms of labour, land, and housing activism (Leung 2015; Hsing 2009; Zhang 2010) 
began to rise. Apart from activism, marginality was expressed through terms such as 
‘Dwelling Narrowness’ (Yu 2011; Hung 2011), ‘ant tribe’ (Zhang 2013), and ‘rat tribe’ 
and, more recently, the Diaosi subject. The latter (self-)narrates as ‘loser’ subjects 
with ‘little hope’ (see below). Their ‘lack of hope’ is dialectically intertwined with the 
global hegemonic construction of China as a ‘hope’ object and its own modernity 
hope of national strength and a quality population. 
 
Exclusionary Practices in China’s Biopolitical Population Management 
Mechanism: ‘Hukou’ and Suzhi’  
 
This dialectics of hope in the changing cultural political economy (Sum and Jessop 
2013) of China is a central feature of the conjuncture in which the Diaosi subject 
emerged. Affected by rising housing prices, bad living conditions and unequal 
access to powerful connections, young migrant workers feel that they have been left 
behind by these neo-liberal commodification drives – made worse by the targeting of 
these workers in state-sponsored modes of devaluation. Drawing on neo-
Foucauldian scholarship (e.g., Miller and Rose 1990; Legg 2005), this section 
considers how the exclusionary household registration (hukou) and ‘suzhi’ systems 
(Pun 2005; Anagnost 2004; Kipnis 2006; Yan 2008; Jacka 2009) co-constitute 
China’s bipolitical management mechanism to create cheaper migrant-labour bodies. 
 
First, the purpose of the hukou system, established in the 1950s, has changed from 
preventing peasants from leaving their land to allowing them to ‘float’ into urban 
areas since the Deng era. Being a peasant in China is not an occupation but a status 
tied to one’s birth (Zhang, N., 2014). Under the hukou system, rural migrants can 
move to cities, work and reside there but are not entitled to urban resources such as 
schooling and hospitals. This discourse of hukou targets the migrant population once 
they move to the cities. It operates as a governmental technology of classification 
and categorizes them as ‘nongmin gong’ (peasant workers). The policy space then 
excludes them from full entitlement to subsidized housing, education, medical care 
and welfare. This functional discrimination is deployed to deny migrants urban 
citizenship. Although the hukou system has undergone several reforms, it is still hard 
to convert from rural to urban status and, where it occurs, the privileges of the urban 
elite and China’s costs of production are challenged in fundamental ways. 
 
Since the 1990s, the exclusionary nature of hukou practices has been exacerbated 
by the modernity discourse of ‘suzhi’, which posits a hierarchy of civility. This not 
only denies the rural population access to urban resources but also devalues it as 
having ‘lower quality’. Thus migrants are judged/labelled as transient and secondary. 
This technology of judgement assigns them a lower status more suitable for 
undesirable employment (.e.g., factory work, construction industry, low service 
sector, etc.) at lower wages (Zhang, F., 2014). These practices can be seen as part 
of a state-based biopolitical population management mechanism that marked 
migrants out as rural-inferior bodies to be assigned lower value in the urban 
environment. Once they migrate from the countryside, such exclusionary practices 
downgrade the value of their life as well as the market value of their labour-power. 
They become the source of cheap and flexible labour serving national development 
and China’s insertion into global capitalism. These hukou-suzhi ways of constructing 
and governing inequalities mean that migrants must resort to living in marginal and 
sub-citizen conditions. Their sub-citizenship plights, together with the rising housing 
prices and rents, mean that industrial and service migrants must rely on employer-
provided dormitories (Pun 2005), rent sub-standard accommodation in villages at the 
peripheries of towns (Wu, Webster, He and Liu 2010: 114-184), or reside in liminal 
spaces (e.g., balconies, roof tops or underground accommodation) in central urban 
conurbations of global cities. In Beijing, some migrants rented/shared small rooms at 
around US$ 65 per month in 2014 in underground air raid shelters/storage spaces 
with communal toilets/kitchens and no natural light. About a million low-wage service 
workers (e.g., waiters, hairdressers, janitors, shop assistance, street peddlers, chefs, 
security guards, construction workers, etc.) occupied this subterranean housing in 
2014 (Pulitzer Centre 2015). This facet of subaltern life is dubbed as ‘rat tribe’ and 
has been captured photographically by Sim (2015). 
Diaosi Embodiment of Marginality and Contradictory Consciousness 
These uneven macrosocial and biopolitical developments also affect their urban 
labouring and vulnerable body. Amongst many forms of expression, young migrants, 
who were users and makers of Internet pop culture and social media, increasingly 
self-narrate their marginality and subalternity as ‘Diaosi’ since the end of 2011. 
Young migrant workers feel that they have been left behind and express their 
marginality affectively through their self-identification as Diaosi. This making of the 
Diaosi subject can be captured by three inter-related moments with regards to bodily 
representations.  
The first started in online fan clubs when they debated about a Chinese soccer 
player called Li Yi. This player once compared his football skills to the celebrated 
French player Thierry Henry (nicknamed ‘Emperor Henry’ in China). On this basis, 
his fans dubbed him ‘Li Yi the emperor’ (da di). This set the scene for the Diaosi 
online wordfest. Thus the term ‘fans’ was transliterated as ‘fe-si’ which means 
‘vermicelli’ kind of noodle. When discussing their football hero, Li Yi’s fans started to 
call themselves di-si (fans of the emperor); and, in return, their critics parodied ‘di’ 
into ‘diao’ which is a slang word for ‘dick’ (penis). Through this transposition from ‘di’ 
to ‘diao’, Li Yi’s fans were no longer ‘fans of emperor’ but ‘fans of penis’ (diao-si).  
This metonymic transposition via the body set the stage for the second moment of 
this collective wordplay. Li Yi’s fans, instead of being offended, appropriated this as a 
self-mocking label within their proud fandom. They took pride in this derogatory label 
that resonated with subaltern migrants caught up in the dialectics of hope and 
frustration in China’s development. This label soon went viral, escaping its original 
social base. Within two months after its coining in 2011, it generated 41.1 million 
search results and 2.2 million blog posts on Google and China’s Twitter-like Weibo 
respectively (Lui 2015). Young subalterns started to proclaim themselves as ‘Diaosi’ 
and there are all kinds of chat rooms and social media set up for this purpose (e.g., 
YY and QQ chats). 
A third moment began as the label gained popularity and Diaosi expressed their new 
system of signification in the public arena. They use their body to express exclusion, 
devaluation, frustration, hardship, social pain as well as unfulfilled consumer and 
romantic desires. They self-represent Diaosi marginality in corporeal terms and 
sceptically and ironically mapped themselves as ‘poor, short and ugly’ losers 
(Marquis and Yang 2013: 3). They visibilize themselves as coming from an 
underprivileged background earning a meagre wage, consuming little and having no 
social connections.2 Their meagre income/consumption and low social standing are 
coupled with the social-emotional side of living a devalued life of long working hours, 
poor housing, uncertain career, living away from family, guilt towards parents at 
home, and empty emotional life with little love/romance/intimacy. This emptiness and 
loneliness are often highlighted in Diaosi narrations of how they spent Valentine’s 
Day, Christmas, festive seasons and the small hours of the night looking for Internet 
companions. Such affective discourses from the margins are not purely personal; 
they also express collective social experiences that are embedded in unequal 
access to state-based urban resources/status as well as inequalities generated by 
neoliberal policies in everyday economic and social life. 
This everyday making of Diaosi subalternity is expressed through a binary trope that 
depicts two main body types based on their unequal access to power networks, 
consumption, love, romance and intimacy. First, male Diaosi self-deprecate as ‘poor, 
short and ugly’. With meagre income and unattractive physiques, they construct 
themselves as unable to impress girls by showering them with material gifts and/or 
charm. They have ‘no house, no car and no bride/girlfriend’ and spend most of their 
time at home, use cheap mobile phones, surf on the Internet, and play media games 
such as DotA. This male-oriented Diaosi construction has gradually spread to female 
subalterns, who also self–narrate as Diaosi. It was estimated that around 500 million 
people self-identify as Diaosi (Gao 2013). The popularity of this identity is partly 
reinforced by the mutual imbrication of the activities of the social media and their 
users. By February 2013, it was even widely circulated on these media (e.g., 
Weibo.com, sina.com, qq.com, tianya.cn; nbweekly.com, etc.) what constitute male 
and female Diaosi ‘standards’ (see table 1).  
Table 1 Mapping of Male and Female Diaosi Standards in 2013 
Typical Male Diaosi  Typical Female Diaosi 
1. Have less than 1000 RMB (USD 
150) cash on you 
2. Wear shoes costing less than 800 
RMB (USD 130) 
3. Have less than three girlfriends 
before marriage 
4. Receive less than 1000 RMB 
(USD 150) in annual bonuses 
5. Use pirated smartphones or those 
under 2000 RMB (USD 300)  
6. No powerful friends  
7. Smoke cigarettes that cost less 
than 20 RMB 
8. No car or use cars costing ess 
than 100 000 RMB (USD 15 000) 
9. Drink only beer and cheap liquor 
10. Did not travel long-distance in the 
last 3-5 years 
1. Never bought bikinis 
2. Never wear bright nail vanish 
3. Never have a matching set of 
lingerie 
4. Never wear high heels over 5 cm 
5. Have not changed hairstyle for the 
last 6 months 
6. Have dieted for more than 5 
months 
7. Never guffaw in public 
8. Walk behind men 
9. Never look at or over-indulge in a 
mirror 





Second, this Diaosi subject is juxtaposed with another body type, characterized as: 
(a) Gaofushuai who are ‘tall, rich and handsome’; and (b) ‘princelings’, who are 
‘second-generation officials’/’second-generation rich’ with special party and family 
connections. In this Diaosi’s system of signification, this second group are ‘superior’ 
and privileged with ‘three treasures’ (iPhone, sports car and designer watch) 
(Marquis and Yang 2013: 9) and also attract beautiful girls (see later). This 
juxtaposition of opposing body types constructs a Diaosi-Gaofushuai binary based 
on economic and social inequalities. Drawing on Scott’s concept of ‘hidden 
transcripts’ (1990), this performative and narrative modern folklore about 
unevenness contains a mix of latent critique, self-mockery, self-protection, and self-
entertainment (Yang, Tang and Wang 2015). It is a mundane way of protesting and 
relieving pressure in a system where exclusion is highly institutionalized and freedom 
of speech involves guerrilla tactics. The gaps between these two groups are further 
highlighted online via satirical cartoons, everyday photographs, TV shows, fantasy 
talks, etc. These include comparing their diverse modes of transport (bus vs. BMW), 
brands of smartphones (Nokia vs. Apple iPhone); eating places (side-street stores 
vs. expensive restaurants), and romantic encounters.  
Apart from framing inequalities via body and consumption types, Diaosi also 
construct themselves as ‘romantically unlucky’ as their ideal girlfriends (named 
‘goddesses’) are ‘Bafumei’ (fair-skinned, rich and pretty) and not ‘Heimu’er’ (‘Black 
Fungus’ women who are overly sexual experienced) (Li, Spotti and Kroon 2014). 
Given their meagre income, unattractive physique and the existence of a match-
making industry catering mainly for rich men (Larmer 2013), Diasoi imagine that they 
will be out-competed by Gaofushuai/princelings and the Bafumei girls only belong to 
these rich and powerful men. This trope was vividly captured in a set of popular 
remarks first posted on ifeng.com:  
‘Diaosi have no money, no background, no future; they love playing DotA, …. 
love ‘moving bricks’ [signifying themselves as workers in construction 
industry]. …. In front of Guofushuai, their fate is to kneel before them; 
gathering all their courage to chat up a ‘goddess’, what they get in return is a 
mocking ‘hal-hal’3 …. They share low status, a boring life, a hopeless future, 
and an empty emotional life, they are not accepted by society.’ 
(http://news.ifeng.com/opinion/special/diaosi/) 
These ironic remarks reveal the subaltern-Diaosi common sense that contains a mix 
of precarious life with little money and no background; the self-mockery of a fate with 
no future/hope; the emotional emptiness of being shunned/mocked by ‘goddesses’, 
the latent hostility towards social elitism embodied by Gaofushuai and princelings; 
and the despair of not being accepted; but these tropes are concurrently 
subordinated to the hegemonic norms of sexual stereotypes and the unfulfilled 
dream of consumerism and entrepreneurialism for socio-economic advancement. 
Such ironic identities (Szablewicz 2014: 268) and contradictory consciousness (à 
laGramsci) involves self-deprecating critiques towards social inequalities but also 
submitting to the seduction of neoliberal consumerism and entrepreneurialism. 
Re-Hegemonization of Diaosi’s Contradictory Consciousness 
This contradictory consciousness could be developed into a more critical 
consciousness and/or be re-hegemonized by dominant forces to provide new hope. 
As the Diaosi identity becomes more popular, celebrities - especially youth icon 
bloggers and technology entrepreneurs – begin to appropriate this identity (Gu 
2014). In addition, it seems that Diaosi identity is partly being mainstreamed and re-
hegemonized in two ways.  
First, with the fall in GDP growth rate from 8 to 7.5% and an official anti-corruption 
campaign, (trans-)national capitals are looking afresh at the subaltern-Diaosi as a 
consumer market that could compensate for falling demand in the luxury goods 
market Thus a popular article first posted on the US-based Tea Leaf Nation 
highlighted that ‘while the high-end market is weak, the Diaosi market prospects are 
bright’ (Zhang and Barreda 2013). This article was translated and re-posted on 
numerous Chinese business websites (e.g. business.sohu.com) and was widely 
regarded as the first Diaosi market report. Riding on this Diaosi tide, Gu (2014) from 
Wall Street Journal further mapped them as a consumer group as follows: 
‘What they lack in spending power compared with Western teens or rich 
Chinese, diaosi make up for in sheer numbers. Some of China's most 
successful companies, including Tencent Holdings Ltd., Alibaba Group and 
YY.com, have built multibillion-dollar businesses targeting them.’ (Source: 
Wall Street Journal, 13 Feb 2013)  
In short, they are re-evaluated by (trans-)national capital as a specific target 
consumer group with unfulfilled dreams of being Gaofushuai. Within China, the 
cultural industries wasted no time in capturing the Diaosi subject via mobile-phone 
games such as ‘Diaosi Spring’, Diaosi fictions/love music, and Sohu’s TV drama on 
‘Diaosi Man’. Other creative Internet-based groups such as Alibaba, YY.com and 
Tencent Holdings Ltd. have designed different virtual products and pleasurable 
experiences to capitalize on their desires for counter-attack, wealth, consumption, 
enjoyment, entertainment and companionship/love/romance/sex.  
In Diaosi’s mode of signification, ‘counter-attack’ is a term borrowed from online war 
games where the losing side regains control and finally wins. Transposing this online 
imagery to the Diaosi-Gaofushuai relationship, counter-attack becomes a way to 
catch up with Gaofushuai in material terms. For example, some financial websites 
(e.g. yunxindai.com) urge Diaosi to launch ‘beautiful counter-attacks’ by buying 
eople-to-people (P2P) products targeting lower-income groups (see table 2). Their 
starting point could be as low as RMB 100. Once they subscribe, they are said to be 
‘investors’ and destined to catch up with Gaofushuai in terms of their possession of 
wealth management products. Thus framed, ‘counter-attack’ is not an act of 
resistance towards structural inequalities; rather it is a hope-based self-
responsibilizing technology (Foucault 1988) to encourage them to constitute 
themselves as ‘investors’ and to work on themselves to improve their conditions in 
an imagined ‘P-2-P’ environment. It thus confirms individualized consumption and 
competitive entrepreneurialism oriented to sushi improvement rather than 
challenging them. These products are appropriated differently with many joining the 
ranks of the millions of users who generate substantial revenues for the providers 
(e.g. see table 2); whilst many others are cautious and, in some cases, financially-
literate Diaosi offer critical advice through websites such as diaosibaoliao.cc and 
p2peye.com. 
The acts of incorporation of Diaosi into the circuit of consumer and financial 
capitalism take other forms too. Retail and cultural industries draw them into their 
orbits by providing fun, pleasure and entertainment to their suffering bodies. For 
example, China’s largest online shopping site, Alibaba’s Taobao, created a Diaosi 
Fashion Club selling goods based on value, quality and fun. Concurrently, global 
mid-range fashion chains such as Zara and H&M are also attracting this group of 
online consumers. The German car magazine, AutoBild, has announced three 
‘cheap branded cars’ to target the Diaosi market (Zhuayoukong.com 2014).  
China’s cultural-entertainment industry is also joining the Diaosi market by providing 
pleasurable group entertainment as ‘cure’ of loneliness. For example, the YY.com 
and 9158 are video-based networks. They feature virtual gift systems in which 
performers can earn credits through activities such as providing chat shows 
conducted by cute/sexy girls, karaoke singing or conducting tutorial videos. 
Participants can convert these virtual credits into real cash. This kind of affordable 
entertainment allows Diaosi to act out Gaofushuai-liked lifestyle and even dating 
fantasies. The QZone, which is run by QQ.com, is popular as migrants can use a 
mobile phone (and not computer) to access the Internet. It is free but charges for 
value-added services such as online games, avatar-based social networks with their 
own currency and products, and a virtual pet portal. On average, users spend about 
USD 20 per month on these products (see table 4). These sites are popular ways of 
keeping in touch with families/friends and their services/products are heavily used, 
possibly as ‘cure’ for loneliness in their devalued life. 
Table 2   Major Internet-Based Groups and their Diaosi-Targeted  
Sites and Products 
Name of 
Corporations 




– On-line shopping 
– Diaosi Fashion Club for 
clothing and accessories 
– Hosting Zara goods 
– Single’s Day for shopping 
 
 Yu'ebao  
– P2P money-market fund 
started since 2013 
– Users can start with RMB 1 
– Offer higher interest rates 
 Single’s Day sales volume  
– RMB 35 billion (USD 
5.7 billion) 2013 
– RMB 19.1 billion (USD 
3.1 billion) 2012 
– RMB 5.2 billion (UDS 
0.8 billion) 2011 
 RMB 554 million (USD 90 
billion) in assets and 81 
million investors in 2014 
and instant liquidity 
– Mainly small clients with an 
average deposit of RMB 
3300 (USD 532) 
– Aggregated amount then 
invest in Zenglibao money-
market fund run by Tianhong 
(a Tianjin-based private-run 
asset management firm) 
 
YY.com  Social communication platform 
 Provide group video sessions on 
concerts, education, fashion, 
sports and personal finance 
 Sessions are hosted by stars 
and can be rewarded by paying 
for their virtual gifts (e.g. lollipop; 
flowers) – a way of living the 
imagined life of Gaofushuai 
 Virtual dating service 
 
 310 million registered 
users and 60 million 
monthly active users 
 Active users spend on 
average RMB 200-300 






– Social messaging service 
and e-commerce 
– Provide online/mobile-phone 
games with cute/sexy girls 
– Sell virtual goods (e.g. funny 
images, pets, clothing and 
accessories to customize 
online avatars, etc.) 
  
89 million customers spent on 
average USD 20 each per 
month 
(Source: Author’s own compilation based on information on the three corporate 
websites) 
Second, complementing this capitalist subsumption of the Diaosi identity (in other 
words, its re-hegemonization) is the re-assertion of party-state leadership over their 
contradictory common sense. Diaosi’s spontaneous critiques towards social 
inequalities and self-mocking ‘subversive laughter’ have not gone unnoticed by those 
in power. This creative use of slang and body tropes captures the social pain, 
frustration and exclusion of the subaltern migrants. It also touches and highlights 
some political sore points with potentials to challenge existing power configurations. 
Recognizing such potentials, there are tendencies since March 2013 to disrupt, de-
politicize and re-hegemonize this contradictory identity to become more consistent 
with the ‘socialist spiritual civilization’, ‘improve suzhi’, ‘social stability’ and, more 
recently, the ‘China Dream’. Cultural actors such as linguists and film directors 
spearheaded this process of de-politicization via a civilizing mission. For some 
linguists, Diaosi’s insinuation of the ‘male genitalia’ was regarded as ‘rude’ and 
‘vulgar’. More specifically, Hao Mingkam, a prominent linguist, a party member and 
founder of the influential Language Scrutiny book series, considered it as 
linguistically corrupted and too crude and uncivilized for public consumption. In his 
explanation for why the term Diaosi failed to make it into the 2012 Ten Most Popular 
Phrases in China, he stated that:  
 
‘…. the extensive use of these words may allow some people to become 
psychologically and morally shameless; they think they can say anything. If a 
person uses vulgar language, his/her behaviour is far from being civilized’ 
(culture.people.com.cn 2013) 
 
In the same period, this civilizing mission was echoed by Feng Xiaogang, who is a 
commercially-successful film director/writer/actor. He claimed that he had difficulties 
in explaining Diaosi to his counterparts abroad. In his microblog, he recorded that 
this identity is not so much self-deprecating as 'self-destructive’ and even ‘brainless’ 
(Chinanews.com 2013). This piece was forwarded tens of thousands of time. This 
has attracted agreement from Hao, the linguist, but this disruption generated 
resentments from within the Diaosi community (Sina.com 2013). Nonetheless, 
language and identity monitors of this kind continue to scrutinize and even sanitize 
the term by morphing it from its original version of Diaosi (meaning ‘fans of penis’) to 
a homonym of ‘Dil-si’ (meaning ‘hanging wire’). Major websites such as Wikipedia (in 
Chinese) and Baidu even posed these two terms as being interchangeable with 
some even claiming that ‘Dil-si’ is more suitable for ‘female Diaosi’. This focus on the 
sanitization of its scatological aspects (Yang, Tang and Wang 2014: 11) depoliticizes 
the social claims of Diaosi and weakens its critical edge. By the end of December 
2014, the official presses also jointed in this civilizing mission. Official newspapers 
were posting critiques of Diaosi and their identity. On 2 December 2014, the 
People’s Daily posted an article on ‘Assessing Diaosi: When will Self-Deprecation 
End?’ This column highlighted that Diaosi is a self-denigrating label and its ‘…. 
cultures neither allow young people to be more independent nor transmit a more 
positive force to the society’. It ‘should be denounced and abandoned, because it 
can cause serious harm to the spirit of youth’ (wenweipo.com 2014). This piece was 
reprinted in other official newspapers such as China Youth Daily. These ways of 
monitoring and civilizing the Diaosi identity do not destroy critical consciousness but 
affect how its contradictory character is played out online in representational 
struggles. 
This marginality is rejected by some subalterns and accepted by others. Some 
indulge in consumption and/or seek pleasure from the culture industries; others live 
in hope and assume personal responsibility to fulfill these entrepreneurial-
consumerist dreams by improving ‘suzhi’, obtaining better qualifications, finding good 
jobs, meeting good marriage partners, and moving over-ground to more comfortable 
housing. These entrepreneurial self-hopes coexist with experiences of social 
inequalities, suffering bodies, self-mocking irony, frustrated sexuality, and hopeless 
future as part of their system of signification. This system is by no means consistent 
or coherent. It contains ‘contradictory consciousness’ and fragmentation (Crehan 
2002: 191-193). The resulting political struggle is embedded in the contradictory 
ensemble of state-mediated capitalist-consumerist social relations that produce 
hope, devalued life, marginality and exploitation in China’s cultural political economy. 
Such contradictory locations are reflected in a common sense that contains 
hegemonic forms of thinking as well as modes of critical insight. It interlaces 
agreement with the dominant consumerist/entrepreneurial ideology and 
precariousness, loneliness, self-mockery, frustrations and latent critical thinking as 
part of the subaltern conditions and languages. 
Two Sets of Concluding Remarks 
 
This article ends with two sets of remarks. First, regarding the Diaosi, it examines the 
dialectical intertwining of a loser/little hope subject with the global imagination of 
China as a ‘hope’ object since the financial crisis. This is the conjuncture in which the 
Diaosi subject emerged. Their marginality is co-governed by global capitalist 
production, the land- and property-based mode of accumulation, and continuous 
state domination via a hukou-suzhi biopolitical population management policy 
mechanism. With increasing inequalities and the making of a devalued life, younger 
second generation workers self-narrate as Diaosi and express such identity 
affectively. They embody their marginality via a body discourse that builds on the 
everyday unevenness regarding power networks, consumption, marriage, love and 
intimacy. This self-representational struggle of Diaosi is fragmented and they remain 
at best a ‘class against the dominant order’ rather than becoming, as a primarily 
class-theoretical analysis might anticipate, a unified class for itself that could 
effectively resist hegemony/domination. Indeed, at the time of writing, dominant 
market actors are providing consumer and entrepreneurial hope and state forces are 
seeking to remake, rehegemonize and disrupt the Diaosi subject with variable 
resonance. From a Gramscian viewpoint, it is worth asking whether the fragments of 
Diaosi could create an autonomous sphere of action that would enable them to 
overcome subalternity in the absence of the full consciousness of their alleged class 
identity and interests? 
Second, by asking these questions inspired by neo-Gramscian insights, this paper 
has also addressed labour/subaltern studies on China. Some Marxist/Weberian 
scholars sought to understand second-generation migrant workers in terms of their 
class position and consciousness (e.g. Chan and Pun 2009; Leung and Pun 2009; 
Chan and Seldon 2013; Chan and Sui 2012: 79-160). These arguments are often 
linear. They assume that conditions of exploitation will either lead to 
proletarianization and identification with the working class or, where this is not fully 
developed, it is explained in Weberian terms concerned with limits on organizational 
and/or representational capacities. Conversely, those interested in the subaltern 
consciousness of migrant labour often focus on their cultural communicative 
practices (e.g., new media, urban cinemas and literature) and their speaker-abilities 
(e.g. Sun 2014; Pun 2005; Yan 2008).  Inspired by first-generation Indian subaltern 
studies, especially Spivak, they hardly mentioned Gramsci, who discussed the 
subaltern in Notebook 25 in 1934. Indeed, this prompted Marcus Green (2002), a 
Gramscian subaltern scholar, to claim ‘Gramsci Cannot Speak’. 
To give Gramsci a voice, this article suggests three (re-)entry points. First, examine 
the production of class consciousness not as automatic but as a culturally-mediated 
lived experience with diverse expressions (Zene 2011). The latter shifts attention 
from the working class (proletariat or sub-proletariat) to ‘subaltern classes/groups’ 
that encompass more components of society (Buttigieg 2013: 36). This allows an 
examination of different types of subaltern groups beyond their labouring identity 
(e.g., Diaosi’s love life). Such marginal groups are fragmented with diverse 
expressions of critical consciousness and contradictory common sense (Ives and 
Green 2010: 304).  
Second, neo-Gramscian insights also question the Marxist/Weberian focus on 
organizational and representational factors affecting the ability of labour to mobilize 
in China. For Green (2002: 19), improving these factors will not overcome group 
marginalization because this has deeper roots in exploitation and contradictions 
grounded in the overall ensemble of social relations with their various kinds of social 
exclusion (Ives and Green 2010: 305). Third, we can examine how subaltern agency 
is positioned between the politics of silence/invisibility dominated by elite discourses 
(cf. Spivak 1988) and the potentials of gaining their own voice and negotiating within 
and in relation to domination (cf. second generation subaltern studies, e.g. Green 
2002: 18; Zene 2011: 96-98; Nielsen and Roy 2015: 1-5).4 Apart from focusing on 
the ability to speak, neo-Gramscians such as Green and Ives (2010: 302-307) stress 
the importance of ‘language and imaginations from the bottom up’ that allow for the 
visibilization of the varieties of subaltern agencies with diverse locations (Liguori 
2015). Sun’s work on Subaltern China (2014) is moving in this direction. However, if 
we seek to go beyond first-generation subaltern studies and return to the Gramscian 
tradition, we should also focus on language/imaginations/discourses (not only 
communication practices), contradictory consciousness of the subaltern as well as 
the concurrent processes of re-hegemonization that involve diverse realignments of 
subaltern knowledge/practices with hegemonic principles (Vahabzadeh 2008: 108). 
In short, a neo-Gramscian entrypoint extends the examination of working-class 
consciousness to different types of subaltern classes/groups. The marginal and 
fragmentary elements of these groups have not become a class for itself; but exist as 
‘multiplicity’ of elements of ‘consciousness construction’ (Modonesi 2014: 2; Green 
and Ives 2010: 292). In this regard, movement beyond first-generation subaltern 
studies discloses a range of subaltern experiences of subordination and 
insubordination and the affective languages and imaginations that contains critical 
and contradictory insights that can be re-grounded diversely in hegemonic principles. 
These constitute parts of the ‘passive revolution’ that depoliticizes and disrupts 
critical insights and alternative thinking among subaltern groups (Thomas 2009: 
147). 




 Worried about social instability, central government took steps between 2010 and 
2013 to dampen the property market (e.g. tightening credit, raising deposits for 
purchase of new land to 50%; restricting the purchase of second and third homes, 
etc.) with moderate effects upon housing prices and rents. 
2 The Market and Media Research Centre of Beijing University conducted a survey 
on the 2014 Living Conditions of Diaosi. Of 210,000 youths interviewed, more than 
60% described themselves as Diaosi. This survey showed that they earned RMB 
2917.7 (USD 479). From this, they spent RMB 500 (USD 81) on rent, RMB 39 (USD 
                                                                                                                                                        
6) per day for 3 meals, RMB 1076 (USD 174) to send to parents, and RMB 500 
(USD 81) on vacations. 
3 ‘Hal-hal’ is a popular Chinese term used by social networks and QQ groups. It has 
various meanings that range from communicating self-mockery through helplessness 
to don’t know what to say. For details, see http://nx.shangdu.com/news/72-16463-
0.html 
4 This article draws on but goes beyond first generation subaltern studies especially 
Spivak’s post-Marxist-Derridean conception of the communicative process between 
subalterns and elites (Zene 2011: 94). Whereas Spivak examines this in terms of 
speech acts, this article directs attention to the contradictory consciousness and self-
representation of the subaltern and everyday struggles. This more Marxist-
Gramscian analysis draws on Green (2002) and second generation subaltern 
scholars (e.g., Zene 2011; Nilsen and Roy 2015). 
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